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The Instability of Joint Ventures: 







We analyze the patterns of international joint venture termination, to compare the learning 
and trust views of joint ventures. We distinguish between three ways in which termination 
may occur and allow for the possibility that some joint ventures never confront the chances 
of terminating in these ways. We find that the chances of terminating a joint venture 
increase over time, in particular when the joint venture is terminated by dissolution of the 
ﬁrm and by acquisition by the foreign partner. Our findings thus support the view that 
learning outperforms trust in explaining the time patterns of joint venture survival. 
 
 
   3
1 Introduction  
A large number of studies report that international joint ventures (IJVs) are unstable (see 
Kogut, 1988; Yan and Zeng, 1999, for ample evidence). Although other deﬁnitions of 
instability have been proposed, most studies equate instability to a short lifespan. But what 
determines the longevity of IJVs and how do the chances of survival evolve over time? One 
view contends that, as the cooperative venture ages, ﬁrms learn about the other party’s 
assets, up to a point when the beneﬁts of joint ventures are offset by their costs and the 
likelihood of joint venture termination increases. Consistent with this view, Hennart (1991) 
found that Japanese subsidiaries in the U.S. are less likely to be joint ventures, the greater 
the age of the subsidiary. An alternative view maintains that repeated interaction over time 
brings trust to the relationship (Gulati, 1998; Inkpen and Currall, 2004), which should 
enhance its prospects. According to this view, the more two partners interact, the more they 
know and trust each other and the better they can cooperate. As they cooperate better, the 
odds of maintaining the relationship increase.  
Despite the obvious implications, the hypothesis that the likelihood of termination of 
IJVs evolves over time has not, to our knowledge, been tested, although some studies have 
controlled for age in their analysis. In this paper, we report the results of a detailed 
investigation into the temporal patterns of the likelihood of joint venture termination. We 
follow the whole set of international joint ventures formed in Portugal during the 1980s and 
1990s and document the evolution of their likelihood of termination. We use these data to 
test the conﬂicting hypotheses that emerge from the theories that see the development of 
joint ventures as a process that leads to an attempt to learn from others, associated with an 
opportunistic view of joint ventures, in contrast to others that see it as a process of learning 
to work with others that permeates the scholarly view in the area of trust. This paper seeks 
to discriminate between these two views, by analyzing the time proﬁle of the evolution of 
the termination rate, a concept known in statistical methodology as age dependence.  
We also take into account that the termination of a joint venture may occur in different 
ways, namely by dissolving the venture or by full acquisition of the venture by one of the 
partners, and discuss the possibility that these forms have different determinants. We are 
not the ﬁrst to acknowledge the existence of these different modes of terminating a joint 
venture, nor to hypothesize that these modes may have different determinants. Kogut   4
(1991) found that unexpected industry growth increases likelihood of acquisition (by one of 
the partners), but unexpected fall in industry shipments does not increase likelihood of 
dissolution. Hennart, Kim, and Zeng (1998) also found that the determinants of termination 
of JVs explain the selling of JVs, but not their liquidation, while Chang and Singh (1999) 
found that older ﬁrms shut down businesses, but younger ﬁrms sell them. Furthermore, they 
found that businesses that have been entered by acquisition are more likely to be exited by 
selloff, a ﬁnding which was also reached by Mata and Portugal (2000) in the context of 
foreign ﬁrms. Very little work has gone into identifying which partners have acquired and 
which have divested the joint venture, an exception being a paper by Hennart, Roehl, and 
Zietlow (1999). These authors used the proportion of the JV being bought by domestic and 
foreign partners as a test of the hypothesis that joint ventures are used as a ‘Trojan horse’ to 
acquire knowledge from the other partner. We integrate the analysis of these different 
termination modes in the context of the analysis of the temporal evolution of the likelihood 
of exit, and are able to document results that have been previously uncovered.  
The fact that we distinguish between different termination modes exacerbates a problem 
which is common to all the studies that rely on age dependence as evidence of theories of 
the time proﬁle of a given phenomenon: the evidence that the probability of terminating a 
joint venture decreases over time (negative age dependence) can be spurious. It may occur, 
not because there is a genuine decrease in the likelihood of termination confronting each 
ﬁrm, but rather because the sample includes, say, two types of ﬁrms, each one confronting a 
risk of termination that is constant over time but different among groups. Indeed, we argue 
that some joint ventures may never terminate in one given mode, thus confronting a zero 
hazard rate. Our empirical methodology accounts for this possibility and we ﬁnd that there 
is, indeed, a nonnegligible fraction of joint ventures that may never terminate by dissolution 
or by foreign acquisition. On the contrary, all ﬁrms confront the risk of becoming fully 
domestic owned. We also ﬁnd that the odds of becoming fully domestic owned are roughly 
constant over time, but that this is not the case for terminations by closure and by foreign 
acquisition. For these modes of terminating a joint venture, we ﬁnd that the odds of 
termination decrease over time but, after a period which we estimate to be between ﬁve and 
six years, increase. These ﬁndings, therefore, support the view of international joint 
ventures as learning ventures, rather than alliances in which trust building compensates for   5
the liabilities of private interests.  
A caveat is in order at this point. We do not know the identity of the partners involved 
in the joint venture. This prevents us from distinguishing the sell off of a foreign owned 
equity to a different foreign partner, or the sell off of domestic equity to a different 
domestic partner. In this sense, our measures are lower bounds to the extent to which joint 
ventures are terminated.  
The paper is organized as follows. The next section discusses the reasons that may lead 
to increasing and decreasing stability of joint ventures over time. Section 3 discusses the 
different modes of terminating a joint venture and the determinants of these modes. In 
section 4, the implications of this discussion for the empirical analysis of terminations of 
joint ventures will be presented. Section 5 discusses the data that we use in the analysis and 
gives an overview of the basic patterns found in these data. Section 6 presents the results 
and section 7 discusses the implications of these results for our views on the instability of 
joint ventures. Finally, section 8 concludes the paper. 
 
2  The stability and instability of joint ventures  
2.1  Learning from partners and the instability of joint ventures  
A major explanation in the literature for the reasons why joint ventures are short lived 
derives from the transaction costs theory of joint ventures. This theory contends that joint 
ventures are a response to failures in markets for particular assets held by different 
companies (Hennart, 1988). Good examples of such assets in the context of multinational 
investment are tacit knowledge about technology from the potential foreign investor and 
about the host country from the local partner. The market failure emerges because local 
ﬁrms ﬁnd it diffcult to acquire knowledge about the unspeciﬁed details of the technology 
and foreign ﬁrms  ﬁnd it diffcult to buy knowledge about the modus operandi of local 
markets. It thus becomes cheaper for the parties to share both assets through a common 
endeavor than to trade them through the market. On the other hand, joint ventures also have 
costs. By making both parties residual claimants on ﬁrm’s proﬁts, they create in both 
parties incentives to freeride. This is one factor that makes these ventures highly unstable. 
Whenever the beneﬁts of joint ventures change, the delicate balance that keeps joint   6
ventures together may break. The possibility of an early termination is often acknowledged 
in the joint venture contract itself, by including clauses that give one partner the option to 
acquire or divest (Chi, 2000).  
As partners repeatedly interact as the cooperative venture ages, they may learn about 
the other party’s assets (Kogut, 1988), and a learning intent is sometimes seen as a primary 
driving force of joint ventures (Hamel, 1991; Khanna, Gulati, and Nohria, 1998; Kale, 
Singh, and Perlmutter, 2000). Such a learning intent has been found to be particularly 
relevant at the earliest stages of the alliance (Tsang, 2002), but learning may also occur as a 
more innocent byproduct of collaboration. No matter what the original intent was, if 
learning occurs, the costs of joint ventures may outweigh their beneﬁts and the other party 
becomes expendable (Inkpen and Beamish, 1997). This view ﬁts well the ﬁndings of 
Hennart (1991), that Japanese subsidiaries in the U.S. are less likely to be joint ventures, 
the greater the age of the subsidiary.  
In the context of the international joint ventures, learning can occur as local partners 
acquire the assets possessed by foreign partners (Lane, Salk, and Lyles, 2001; Lyles and 
Salk, 1996) or as foreign partners acquire local knowledge (Tsang, 2002; Inkpen and 
Beamish, 1997). The evidence so far does not unequivocally show that some partners are 
trying to learn the other party’s secrets while the other is trying to conceal them from the 
former. On the contrary, Lane, Salk, and Lyles (2001) found that effectiveness in as-
similating foreign partner knowledge is highly related to previous knowledge between 
partners and to the willingness of foreign partners to train their local associate (see also 
Steensma, Tihanyi, Lyles, and Dhanaraj, 2005). And, while Inkpen and Beamish (1997) 
explicitly stated that the Japanese control of the marketing functions in AmericanJapanese 
joint ventures located in the U.S. might be a device to enable them to learn about local 
conditions and reduce the dependence on their local partners, the results of Hennart, Roehl, 
and Zietlow (1999) question this view. They tested whether the proportion of acquisitions 
by foreign and locals was different in these joint ventures and concluded that it was not.  
Because learning occurs as time goes by, our formulation of the ‘opportunistic’ view of 
joint ventures posits that  
   7
Hypothesis 1) As joint ventures age, they become more likely to terminate.  
 
 
2.2  Trust among partners and the stability of joint ventures  
Some joint ventures last a long time, and trust among partners is often cited as a key to their 
extended longevity. The general idea around the theme of trust and its impact upon the 
stability of joint ventures is that trust intensiﬁes over time (Gulati, 1998). As time evolves 
and partners get better acquainted with each other, they will trust each other more and 
require fewer formal contractual arrangements to organize transactions. Trust develops as 
partners’ expectations that the venture is going to continue increase, and it impacts 
positively on the performance of international partnerships (Aulakh, Kotabe, and Sahay, 
1996), which in turn adds incentive to keep the joint venture going (Yan, 1998).  
High levels of trust may even lead to increased willingness to provide access to 
proprietary information and thus create the basis for others to learn about the partner 
(Inkpen and Currall, 2004). Relationships of trust have been found to allow partners to be 
selective with respect to the type of knowledge they share or protect, enhancing the 
possibilities of achieving two seemingly contradictory goals. Kale, Singh, and Perlmutter 
(2000) found that at the same time that trust enhances learning from partners, it also eases 
the task of protecting the core knowledge that partners wish to keep proprietary.  
Inkpen and Currall (2004) suggest that the process of developing trust among partners 
may be the basis of a complex and nonmonotonic relationship between age and the hazard 
rates of joint ventures. They suggest that after a honeymoon period immediately following 
the formation of joint venture, a critical period may follow, in which the levels of trust are 
low and the hazard rate increases signiﬁcantly. Joint ventures that manage to survive that 
stage will be able to develop trust and hazard rates will decrease.  
If trust is the key determinant of the stability of joint ventures over time, we should 
observe that  
 
Hypothesis 2) As joint ventures age, they become less likely to terminate.  
 
   8
 
3 Modes of terminating a joint venture  
There are different ways of terminating a joint venture. The venture can be dissolved by 
shutting down its facilities, or it may continue operating under full control of one of the 
previous partners. In the case of international joint ventures, it can continue under full 
domestic or foreign ownership, depending on which partner sells and which one acquires 
equity in the ﬁrm. These three different outcomes are likely to be governed by different 
forces and some given attributes of the joint ventures are likely to exert disparate impacts 
upon the probabilities of terminating in different ways.  
3.1 Determinants of joint venture termination  
3.1.1 Equity share  
Conditions that are relevant for the longevity of joint ventures include the initial contractual 
arrangements established between partners. Different partners have different contributions 
to the joint venture and these contributions are reﬂected in the agreements under which JVs 
are formed (Blodgett, 1991). Although control of a joint venture cannot be taken to be 
identical to the distribution of equity among partners, the initial distribution of equity 
reﬂects the distribution of bargaining power among partners and control over the ﬁrm (Yan 
and Gray, 1994; Mjoen and Tallman, 1997).  
For the joint venture to be stable, the arrangements must be such that all parties are 
satisﬁed with them. Uneven distributions of equity may have costs for the stability of the 
joint venture, because the smaller the share that one partner has in the joint venture, the 
greater the likelihood that it will behave opportunistically (Inkpen and Currall, 2004), and 
freeride on the other partner.  
Joint ventures with uneven equity splits have been found to be more likely to be 
terminated (Blodgett, 1992). Termination, in these cases, is likely to occur due to the 
initiative of the dominant partner to avoid this opportunistic exploitation. Furthermore, to 
the extent that large equity shares reﬂect a partner’s high contribution to the joint venture, a 
large share in the venture is an indication that the ﬁrm may more easily survive without the 
other party than with them. Therefore, if one partner holds a disproportionately high equity 
share in the ﬁrm, the chances are that it will eventually acquire full control of the ﬁrm.    9
 
Hypothesis 3) The greater the share of equity held by one partner, the more ikely it is 




3.1.2 Antecedents of the joint venture  
Joint ventures can be formed either by creating a new ﬁrm or by having a new partner 
acquire a share in an ongoing ﬁrm. These antecedents are likely to affect the termination 
rates and the mode by which joint ventures are terminated.  
Joint ventures are subject to the normal risk of doing business as much as any other 
ﬁrm. Joint ventures which have been created from scratch are more likely to be dissolved 
than those that have been created by partially taking over an existing ﬁrm, very much in the 
same way that ﬁrms that have once been acquired are more likely to be sold off than shut 
down (Chang and Singh, 1999; Mata and Portugal, 2000).  
Indeed, the fact that the ﬁrm was already in operation indicates that it has had a longer 
time to develop goodwill and reputation, and thus will be less likely to be dissolved. Also, 
the fact that a ﬁrm has been partially acquired in the past indicates that its capital is not 
highly speciﬁc, as it was possible to ﬁnd a buyer in the market. It should thus indicate that a 
compatible buyer is more likely to be found if the joint venture is to be terminated.  
When the joint venture has been initiated by partially acquiring an ongoing ﬁrm, it is 
very likely that termination may occur via reacquisition by its former full owner. After 
concluding that the joint venture is not a good match between the partners, a buyback 
would amount to returning to the previous position. Thus, ﬁrms that were previously 
wholly domestic are more likely to return to their wholly domestic status, while those that 
were previously fully owned by foreigners are more likely to become wholly owned by 
foreigners again.  
 
Hypothesis 4a) Joint ventures that were created from an already existing ﬁrm are more 
likely to be acquired and less likely to be shut down than greenﬁeld joint ventures.    10
 
Hypothesis 4b) Joint ventures that were created from an already existing ﬁrm are more 
likely to be bought back by the original partner than to be acquired by the joining party. 
 
 
3.1.3 Ownership advantages and asset speciﬁcity  
Ownership advantages are typically associated with the ability of ﬁrms to develop ﬁrm-
speciﬁc assets, which cannot be imitated by competitors and provide the basis for their 
competitive advantage (Wernerfelt, 1984; Barney, 1991). Firms with such assets are 
normally those that conduct R&D activities and spend considerably on advertising. In the 
context of foreign subsidiaries, Delios and Beamish (2001) found that intangible assets 
affect the survival of foreign subsidiaries and that R&D expenditures, in particular, affect 
the survival of joint ventures.  
Although activities such as R&D may involve substantial spending on physical 
facilities and equipment, the ability of ﬁrms to use advanced technologies relies heavily on 
the presence of a highly educated workforce (Autor, Katz, and Krueger, 1998). Indeed, a 
number of authors have indicated that only human capital, not physical capital, can provide 
the basis for sustained competitive advantage (Youndt, Snell, Dean Jr, and Lepak, 1996). 
As (Barney, 1991, p. 110) puts it, “Physical technology, whether it takes the form of 
machine tools or robotics or complex information management systems, is by itself 
imitable”. One of the few classes of assets that are not tradeable today are knowledge assets 
(Teece, 1998), which puts the ultimate source of competitive advantage of a ﬁrm in its 
employees.  
Knowledge assets are hard to imitate because of the complex and tacit nature of 
knowledge (Polyani, 1966). To the extent that it is tacit, knowledge is not amenable to be 
codiﬁed, but is embodied in the organization’s routines and processes (Nelson and Winter, 
1982; Coff, 1997; Teece, 1998). However, as Grant (1996) notes, knowledge exists only in 
individuals, and an important way of acquiring knowledge and developing the ability to 
generate new knowledge is through formal education. Although the evidence suggests that 
a number of managerial decisions, ranging from on the job training programs to human   11
resources selection procedures, can change the stock of human capital in the ﬁrm (Snell and 
Dean Jr, 1992; Youndt, Snell, Dean Jr, and Lepak, 1996), there is also evidence that 
investments in ﬁrmspeciﬁc human capital are more productive if the workforce has large 
endowments of general human capital, of the type provided by formal education (Altonji 
and Spletzer, 1991). This suggests that schooling may be seen as an indicator of the quality 
of the land where the seed of human resource management is to blossom. Highly qualiﬁed 
labor indicates a high content of knowledge and tacit and explicit knowledge are 
complementary (Inkpen and Beamish, 1997). Also, highly qualiﬁed labor will be more apt 
to learn, but tacit knowledge leads to ambiguity and to low levels of knowledge transfer 
(Simonin, 2004).  
 
Hypothesis 5) Joint ventures with a greater human capital endowment experience a 
lower probability of being terminated.  
 
 
3.2 Some terminations may never occur  
Some termination modes may never be considered by some joint ventures. If faced with 
likely termination, they will always choose an alternative mode of terminating. Note that 
we are not saying that some joint venture will never terminate at all; only that some will 
never choose some modes of terminating.  
3.2.1 Closures  
For some ﬁrms, closure is not an option: utilities are an obvious example, but others would 
be possible: producers of goods with low value content per unit of weight or produced in 
highly speciﬁc facilities, such as mineral water, beer or cement, or providers of services for 
which a highly speciﬁc distribution network is important. If these ﬁrms encounter 
problems, they may be traded, but shut down is highly unlikely.  
When we say that they will not be shut down, we mean, at least within the foreseeable 
future. It is highly unlikely that people will stop drinking water, but if a close substitute for 
cement is discovered that can be produced at much lower costs, it is not impossible that   12
cement plants will eventually fade away. Also, although there may be some industry 
characteristics that make this more likely, it need not be the case that all ﬁrms in a given 
industry do not shut down. It may be that some ﬁrms in that industry consider shut down as 
an option while others do not.  
 
3.2.2 Acquisition by foreign partners  
Some ﬁrms may never be fully acquired by foreign partners. A ﬁrst reason for this to be so 
is that, in some countries, there may be government restrictions. In other countries, even if 
it is not legally required, it may be diffcult to do business without a local partner. 
Restriction may apply across the board (e.g. limit of 74% foreign ownership in India) or to 
a particular industry (e.g. airlines in most OECD countries Conway, Janod, and Nicoletti, 
2005). Even when there are no such limits in the law, countries often try to impede 
acquisitions of some ﬁrms by foreigners. One such attempt occurred with success in April 
2007 when, despite the nonexistence of any foreign ownership limits on 
telecommunications in Italy, the Italian Prime Minister Romano Prodi, made a call on 
Italian banks to help stave off the takeover of Telecom Italia by the Mexican America 
Movil. The Spanish operator Telefonica acquired a minority equity share in the Italian 
telecom operator, but the government succeeded in achieving its goal of preventing 
Telecom Italia from becoming foreign controlled.  
A second reason for some joint ventures never becoming fully owned is a heavy 
reliance on geographically distributed resources. Running a highly decentralized 
distribution network, for example, requires constant monitoring and will be best done by 
someone based in the country. While this need not be done through a joint venture (other 
alternative arrangements may be available, e.g. franchising), if an “own distribution” 
network is preferred, the foreign partner may never consider operating it itself. Typically, 
the advantage of foreign partners rests elsewhere, and they will not wish to invest resources 
locally in areas that are not related to their core advantage. The foreign partner may 
consider ﬁnding another domestic partner or, if this is not feasible, divest from the country. 
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3.2.3 Acquisition by domestic partners  
Finally, domestic partners may never consider acquiring some international joint ventures, 
when the contribution of foreign partners is typically highly speciﬁc. Foreign partners must 
possess some speciﬁc assets (normally associated with knowledge of a particular 
technology, or possession of ﬁrmspeciﬁc goodwill, in the form of brands, trademarks, etc.) 
that enable them to compensate for the liability of foreignness.  
It may thus be impossible for a domestic ﬁrm to replace the contribution of the foreign 
partner, as the knowledge required to eliminate foreign dependency is usually more diffcult 
to acquire than that required to eliminate dependency from local partners (Inkpen and 




4 Empirical implications of these views  
4.1 A Statistical Model for Analyzing Exit over Time  
For analyzing the time pattern of the longevity of joint ventures, we rely on statistical 
models belonging to a class of models known as duration analysis (Lancaster, 1990) or 
event history analysis (Allison, 1984). The conventional continuous time duration models 
are not appropriate in our case, as we observe durations only at year intervals. Instead, we 
will use a simple discrete time duration model: the complementary loglog (cloglog) model.  
 
Consider time to be divided into k intervals [ ) , 1 0 τ τ , [ ) , 2 1 τ τ  . . .[ ) , 1 ∞ − k τ . We observe joint 
ventures at discrete points in time  } ,..., 1 { k T ∈ where  t T =  denotes the termination of a 
joint venture within the interval [ ) , 1 t t τ τ − . The hazard function, which gives the probability 
of terminating the joint venture during interval t, given that it was still active at the 
beginning of this interval, is given by  
 
), | ( ) ( t T t T P t h ≥ = =            1 ,... 2 , 1 − = k t  
and the survivor function, which gives the probability of staying active up until tis deﬁned 
as    14
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To incorporate the effect of explanatory variables upon survival, we apply the same 
approach as in the conventional proportional hazards model (Cox, 1972), and deﬁne  
) ' exp(
0 ) ( ) | (
β i x
i t S x t S =  
 
where  ) | ( i x t S is the probability that the individual joint venture i with covariates  i x  
(which measure those of its characteristics that are relevant to survival), will remain active 
up to time t, and  ) ( 0 t S denotes the baseline survivor function (that is, where the covariates 
equal zero). Given the relationship between the hazard and the survivor functions above, 
one can write  
[ ]
) ' exp(
) ( 1 ) | ( 1 0
β i x
t h x t h i − = −  
which leads to the cloglog hazard function  
[ ]
) ' exp(
) ( 1 1 ) | ( 0
β i x
t h x t h i − − =  
 
The baseline hazard function may be parameterized using different functional forms, 
and the regression coeffcients may be interpreted as in standard proportional hazards 
models. The model can be estimated straightforwardly, by transforming the duration data 
into binary outcomes, a procedure known as “episode splitting”, and using maximum 
likelihood methods to ﬁt a generalized linear model with binomial error and complementary 
loglog link.  
In writing the likelihood function, a distinction has to be made between joint ventures 
that were terminated and those that were run as joint ventures until the end of the survey. 
To the former, we can assign discrete durations. To the latter, all we know is that their 
duration exceeds a given limit, and thus the observations are right censored. This same 
statistical methodology applies to the three modes of terminating a joint venture and three 
equations are estimated. In order to separate the determinants of these three different exit 
modes, a clear distinction has to be made between joint ventures that terminate because the   15
ﬁrm is shut down and those which are fully acquired by domestic or foreign owners. When 
any one of these events occurs, the observation is treated as censored in the other two exit 
mode equations.  
 
4.2 Age dependence  
We are particularly interested in the way the hazard rates evolve over time. If hazard rates 
increase over time, we say the phenomenon exhibits positive age (or duration) dependence; 
if hazard rates decrease over time, the phenomenon exhibits negative age dependence; if 
hazard rates are constant over time, the phenomenon does not exhibit any age dependence 
at all.  
A common approach to the modeling of age dependence is to assume that  ) ( 0 t h  
follows a given distribution, popular choices being the Weibull and the lognormal. There 
are serious potential drawbacks with an a priori use of this approach. First, the choice of an 
inappropriate distribution to model  ) ( 0 t h may seriously endanger our conclusions about 
the nature of the evolution of the hazard rates over time and, as the most common 
distributions are not nested with each other, it is not easy to choose between them. These 
problems are compounded when duration data is grouped into time intervals. As before, if 
the discrete nature of the duration variable is not taken into account, the estimation 
procedure will lead to inconsitent regression coefficients and a misleading picture of 
duration (age) dependence.  
In our discrete duration model,  ) ( 0 t h  can be easily modelled as function of age, 
avoiding the imposition of severe distributional assumptions, a rather ﬂexible speciﬁcation 
being one that models the hazard rate as a polynomial function of Age. Estimation proceeds 
from a ﬁrst order polynomial by adding as many higher order terms as necessary. The 
process stops when higher order terms are found not to be signiﬁcant. This allows the 
hazard function to have as many inﬂection points as is most appropriate to ﬁt the data well, 
without any parametric constraint as it would occur with predetermined distribution 
functions. 
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4.3  Consequences of some JVs never terminating in a given mode  
Age dependence, as explained above, refers to the pattern of evolution of the hazard rates 
over time. Negative age dependence may, however, be observed for spurious reasons if the 
population under analysis contains unobserved (or unkown) heterogeneous groups of ﬁrms, 
each exhibiting different levels of risk. In this case, even if there is no genuine age 
dependence, that is, even if the risk confronting each ﬁrm is constant over time, the 
observer may conclude that the risk is lower and lower over time. This will occur because 
ﬁrms in the group with higher risk will leave the sample more rapidly than do those in the 
other group. The remaining sample will, therefore, be made up of an increasingly 
proportion of firms with a low risk of exit..  
To make these ideas clearer, consider a simple extreme case in which we have 160 
ﬁrms, in two groups of 80 ﬁrms each. One of the groups confronts a constant hazard rate of 
50% while the other confronts no risk of exit (0% hazard rate). In the ﬁrst period, 40 ﬁrms 
from the ﬁrst group will exit, and an observer will calculate the overall hazard rate to be 
25% = 40/160. In the second period, 20 ﬁrms (one half of the remaining ﬁrms in the ﬁrst 
group) will exit again, and the observer will calculate the hazard rate to be now 16.7% = 
20/120. Therefore, if the analyst cannot identify the group to which each JV belongs to, he 
runs the risk of concluding for negative age dependence, that is for a “trust” explanation for 
the time pattern of exit, while this is not warranted given the data. Note that the opposite is 
not true – one may never be led into the conclusion of positive duration dependence.  
 
 
4.4 Handling terminations that will never occur  
To incorporate the possibility of “defective” risks, that is, the possibility that some units 
may survive forever, we redeﬁne the survival function, which represents the proportion of 
joint ventures that did not terminate until t as  () ( 1 ) () St p p St =− + % , where  p  is the 
proportion of joint ventures that face a risk of dissolution, that is, which are indeed 
“susceptible” to the risk of failure. The survival probability is, therefore, given by the 
proportion of long-term survivors, ) 1 ( p − , which do not exit into a given destination with 
probability 1, plus the proportion of ”susceptible” ﬁrms,  p , multiplied by their 
corresponding probability of remaining a joint venture until t,  ) (t S .    17
Models of this type have been used with a single risk in the analysis of the acquisition 
of new products (Anscombe, 1961), job stability (Yamaguchi, 1992), deaths by AIDS 
(Struthers and Farewell, 1989) or criminal recidivism (Schmidt and Witte, 1989). 
Generalization to multiple independent risks is straightforward (Addison and Portugal, 
2003), the maximization of the likelihood function producing estimates for one additional 
unknown parameter  p  for each mode of termination. In order to guarantee that each p lies 
between zero and one, the logit reparameterization for  )) exp( 1 /( ) exp( µ µ + = p  was 
employed. This has no other consequence in terms of ﬁnding evidence of longterm 
survivors, since it does not preclude p from being as close to one (or zero) as needed. 
 
5 Data  
The data used in this paper were obtained from an annual survey (Quadros de Pessoal, 
hereinafter QP) which has been conducted by the Portuguese Ministry of Employment 
since 1982. Unlike most databases employed in the analysis of alliance and foreign direct 
investment, our data are not restricted to the largest companies, and include ﬁrms of all 
sizes, as the survey covers all ﬁrms employing paid labor in Portugal. We worked with the 
original raw data ﬁles from 1982 to 2002, which include over 100,000 ﬁrms in each year.  
The survey has two characteristics which make this data set a unique source for 
analyzing the survival of joint ventures. First, the survey has a longitudinal dimension, i.e. 
ﬁrms are identiﬁed by a unique number which allows ﬁrms to be followed over time. 
Second, the survey records the share of equity held by nonresidents, which we use for 
identifying joint ventures.  
We are concerned here with foreign joint ventures, that is, ﬁrms that have a signiﬁcant 
(but not total) foreign equity participation. Because of this, we restricted our analysis to 
those ﬁrms having a foreign participation between 10% and 90%. The 10% threshold is 
usually employed to distinguish foreign direct investment from portfolio investment, as this 
is the threshold that normally grants the right to designate one board member. Using this 
criterion, we were able to identify 2234 newly formed joint ventures, which comprise our 
sample. An important limitation in the database is that we do not know the identity of the 
ﬁrms’ owners. This is unfortunate because we will not be able to identify the number of   18
partners in the joint venture nor will we be able to identify joint ventures where all partners 
are foreign companies. Moreover, we will not be able to trace the acquisition of a share 
held by one foreign ﬁrm that is sold to another foreign ﬁrm and, similarly, we will not be 
able to identify the selling of a domestic position if both the buyer and the seller are 
domestic ﬁrms.  
Our deﬁnition of entry involves the creation of a new equity alliance between foreign 
and domestic partners. These new JVs may be created in three different ways. The ﬁrst 
involves the creation of a new legal entity. The second is by having a foreign party acquire 
a stake in an already existing ﬁrm that was until that moment entirely held by domestic 
owners. Finally, the third is by having a domestic partner acquire a stake in an ongoing ﬁrm 
which was previously entirely owned by foreign owners. Symmetrically, we identify three 
ways in which an equity joint venture may terminate: by shutting down the ﬁrm, by being 
totally acquired by domestic or foreign partners.  
We were able to identify the longevity of joint ventures because ﬁrms are identiﬁed in 
the survey by numbers, which are assigned sequentially when they ﬁrst report to the survey. 
The moment in which joint ventures are formed was identiﬁed by comparing ﬁrms’ 
identiﬁers over the years. Greenﬁeld joint ventures, i.e. joint ventures that did not exist as 
independent legal entities prior to their formation were located by comparing the ﬁrms’ 
number with the highest identiﬁcation number in the ﬁle in the previous year. The creation 
of joint ventures when such creation was by acquisition was identiﬁed by locating the ﬁrst 
year in which a previously existing ﬁrm exhibited a percentage of foreign equity between 
10% and 90%. Our analysis includes joint ventures that were formed during the period 
1983-1999, a period which was chosen on the basis of the available data.  
To compute our longevity measures we located the moment when ﬁrms exit by 
searching the ﬁles for the ﬁrst year the ﬁrm ceases to report to the survey or the ﬁrst year 
the  ﬁrm’s foreign equity is outside the 10%-90% interval. To be on the safe side in 
computing life spans with such a large database, we performed additional controls before 
classifying the absence of report as a termination. Namely, we required that a ﬁrm be 
absent from the ﬁle for at least two years in order to be classiﬁed as a closure. For this 
reason, in our subsequent analysis we use data only until 2000, although our data ﬁles go 
until 2002. Using this methodology we determined the longevity of joint ventures formed   19
during the period 1983-1999 and ceased not later than 2000. For the remaining JVs started 
during the same period, all we know is that they were still active in 2000, thus making our 
duration measure right-censored.  
 
5.1 Variables  
We use the information in our data set to develop measures for the variables outlined in 
Section 3 that account for the survival of ﬁrms.  
5.1.1 Equity share  
While the foreign share can vary on a continuous scale between 0 and 100, earlier studies 
(e.g. Franko, 1989) typically used categories such as minority, equal stake, majority owned 
joint ventures to account for partners control over joint ventures. More recently, Dhanaraj 
and Beamish (2004) suggested that equity share should be used to explain survival of 
international joint ventures rather that these broad categories, and this was the variable used 
in this work. 
 
5.1.2 Antecedents  
We measure the antecedents of the joint venture with two dummies indicating the ﬁrm 
status prior to becoming a joint venture. One dummy indicates whether the ﬁrm was 
previously wholly foreign owned, while the other indicates whether it was previously 
wholly owned by domestic owners. The omitted category includes ﬁrms which were 
created simultaneously with the creation of the JV.  
 
5.1.3 Ownership advantages and asset speciﬁcity  
We measure the propensity to develop ﬁrmspeciﬁc assets by computing the share of college 
graduates among the ﬁrm’s labor force. The conventional measurement of human capital 
relies on different measures of the educational levels of the individuals (Mincer, 1974), 
college being a threshold sometimes employed (e.g. Phan and Lee, 1995).  
Empirical studies have measured the extent of asset speciﬁcity intensity of ownership-  20
speciﬁc advantages by using different measures of the educational level of the workforce as 
proxies for human capital in the ﬁrm (Pugel, 1978; Lall, 1980; Mata and Portugal, 2000; 
Villalonga and McGahan, 2005). 
 
5.2 Control variables  
5.2.1 Size  
Firm size was included as a control variable because, everything else being equal, ﬁrms 
which are larger have incurred the sunk costs which are normally greater than the 
corresponding costs incurred by small ﬁrms. Therefore, ex post small entrants should be 
more likely to exit than large ones (Sharma and Kesner 1996). Previous evidence on the 
effect of ﬁrm size on the survival of ﬁrms suggests a very robust negative effect (Mitchell 
1994, Haverman 1995, Sharma and Kesner 1996). The relationship between size and the 
likelihood of divestiture is less obvious and the empirical studies that have analyzed exit by 
divestment have not found any signiﬁcant relationship between divestment and the size of 
ﬁrms (Schary 1991, Mitchell 1994).  
Size was measured here by the logarithm of the number of persons in the ﬁrm. 
 
5.2.2 Foreign presence  
We also control for the extent of foreign presence in the industry where entry is attempted. 
The impact of previous presence of foreign ﬁrms upon the survival of the new foreign 
owned ﬁrms has been under scrutiny in different studies (e.g. Mascarenhas, 1992; Mitchell, 
Shaver, and Yeung, 1994; Shaver, Mitchell, and Yeung, 1997). Most of the arguments 
developed in this line of research are of a time-series nature, comparing the positions of 
ﬁrst-movers with those of late-movers.  
In our case, our variation is largely cross-sectional. We thus expect previous foreign 
presence to signal the presence of those characteristics, such as advertising and 
technological intensity, which make foreign survival more likely. These are characteristics 
which we are not able to observe directly, but which are also related to the previous 
presence of foreign ﬁrms in the market (Dunning, 1993; Caves, 1996). We include previous   21
foreign presence in the industry as a means of controlling for these unobserved industry 
characteristics, which may be related to the survival of foreign ﬁrms.  
Foreign presence is measured by the proportion of employment in the industry that is 
accounted for by foreign ﬁrms.  
 
5.3 Summary statistics  
Summary statistics for the independent variables and correlations between them are 











5.4 Continuation and termination of joint ventures  
 
 
Insert Table 2 
 
 
Table 2 displays our estimates of the survival rate of continuation as joint ventures. 
Although our data cover a span of 18 years, and all the available data are used in the 
regressions, the table displays the survival rates for the ﬁrst 13 years only. As age increases, 
the number of observations becomes smaller for two reasons. One reason is that there are 
joint ventures which terminate. Only 75% of the total number of joint ventures that are 
formed (2234 in our sample) are able to make it through the following year. The second 
reason is that not all joint ventures are observed over the same number of years. While 
those that are formed in 1983 are observed over 18 years, those that are formed in 1993 are 
observed for only 8 years. These two effects compound to produce smaller samples for   22
older ages, and thus less precise estimates. Consequently, for older ages, the precision of 
the estimates is lower than for younger ones.  
To examine the patterns of survival in more detail, Figure 1 displays the observed 
hazards of a joint venture being terminated by closure, by acquisition of the domestic 
partner and by acquisition of the foreign partner, respectively. The observed patterns are 
not identical for the three types of exit. It clearly decreases for termination by closure, at 
least during the ﬁrst years, it reaches a plateau in which it is more or less constant and 
increases markedly in the last years of the observation period. The hazards of being 
acquired by a domestic partner are pretty much constant over time, increasing somewhat at 
the two last years of observation. Finally, the hazards of being acquired by the foreign 
partner drop abruptly from the ﬁrst to the second year, then rise very slightly for a number 








The regressions presented in the next section will also allow us to take Figure 1 into 
account the effects of the determinants of termination upon these hazard rates and the 




6 Results  
Results of our regression analysis are displayed in Table 3. For each mode of terminating a 
joint venture, four equations are reported. The ﬁrst two are the conventional complementary 
loglog model while the third and fourth take into account the possibility that there might 
exist a fraction of the population of joint ventures that does not confront the risk of being 
terminated under the mode in analysis. For each model, we report a speciﬁcation with only 
a linear term on age and one with a quadratic term as well.  
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The results indicate that the determinants of the different modes of terminating a joint 
venture are, indeed, different. Both size and the proportion of college graduates have a 
negative impact on the probability that the joint venture is terminated by closure. In 
contrast, size and college graduates are irrelevant to the probability of being acquired by the 
domestic or foreign partners.  
Closures are associated with being a greenﬁeld entry: if the ﬁrm existed previously to 
the formation of the joint venture, the risk of the joint venture being terminating by the 
closure of the ﬁrm is signiﬁcantly reduced compared to when it was previously wholly 
owned by either domestic or foreign owners. Previous ownership is irrelevant to domestic 
acquisitions, but foreign acquisitions are more likely if the ﬁrm had been previously owned 
by foreigners.  
Equity share is not relevant to the probability of closure, but it is relevant to the 
probability of acquisition both by foreign and domestic partners. The likelihood of being 
fully acquired is higher the greater it is the share of the partner in the joint venture. 
Previous foreign presence in the industry is important to all termination modes. Again, 
this variable has opposite signs in the two acquisition equations. Foreign acquisition is 
more likely in industries with greater foreign presence, while domestic acquisitions are less 
likely in these industries. Closures of joint ventures are less likely in industries with a 
strong foreign presence. Overall, these results support the idea that industries which have a 
strong foreign presence are those that are more conducive to the survivability of 
international joint ventures.  
The probability that some joint ventures never terminate in one given mode is estimated 
to be positive (and around 36%) in the closure and foreign equations, but it is estimated to 
be zero in the domestic acquisition equation. What could this result mean? One might think 
that if a foreign partner is going to divest from the country, there may be plenty of 
candidates to occupy its position. First, domestic partners will not have to compensate for a   24
liability of foreignness. Second, they may have lower opportunity costs, which means that 
they may be satisﬁed by enjoying lower levels of proﬁts than foreign ﬁrms would require. 
Consequently, they may decide to take opportunities that foreign ﬁrms would not take. 
Note that this result also means that none of the joint ventures is sheltered from the overall 
risk of terminating. The overall probability of never terminating is given by the product of 
the probabilities that joint ventures never terminate in each mode. As one of the 
probabilities is zero, the overall probability is zero as well.  
When we allow for the possibility of a nonmonotonic relationship between age and the 
termination of joint ventures, the evidence is mixed: no such pattern is uncovered for 
domestic acquisitions: the squared term is positive, but nonsigniﬁcant, and the minimum of 
the hazard rates is estimated to be at the age of 77 years. For closures and foreign 
acquisitions, the coeffcients are positive and marginally signiﬁcant. The minima of the 
hazard rates are estimated to be at the age of 9 and 8 years, respectively. A cubic term was 
also attempted (not reported in the table). In the only case where it was marginally 
signiﬁcant (foreign acquisitions), the minimum of the hazard rates was estimated to be at 
the age of 6 with a maximum at the age of 13.  
Taking into account the possibility that some joint ventures never terminate in one 
given mode produces larger coeffcients, except concerning the effect of time. For the 
domestic acquisition mode of termination, the proportion of joint ventures that never 
terminate is estimated to be practically zero and the model resorts to the complementary 
loglog.  
As expected, the impact of controlling for the possibility that some joint ventures do not 
confront the risk of terminating in one particular mode attenuates the negative effect of age. 
In the complementary loglog model, the coeffcient of Age is negative and signiﬁcant for all 
the equations (columns 1, 5, and 9). Controlling for the possibility of no termination 
produces coeffcients which are not signiﬁcant (column 11), or are only marginally 
signiﬁcant (column 3). When the quadratic speciﬁcation is considered, the impact of 
accounting for the possibility of no terminations is to decrease the positive coeffcient of 
Age and increase the magnitude and signiﬁcance of the negative coeffcient of Age squared. 
Based on these coeffcients, the age after which the hazard rate starts increasing is estimated 
to be at 5 and 6 years in the closure and foreign acquisition equations, respectively. The   25




7 Discussion  
Overall, our results suggest a complex pattern for the effect of age upon termination of joint 
ventures. During the ﬁrst years, the likelihood of termination seems to decrease, thus 
suggesting support for a trust view of the relationship. After a number of years (not many, 
according to our estimates) the likelihood of exit starts increasing, thus supporting an 
‘opportunistic’ view of joint venture.  
The results for the acquisitions by the domestic partners are in sharp contrast with those 
for the other modes of termination, but they are all consistent and conform well with our 
expectations. Domestic partners acquire mainly ﬁrms in which they have a dominant equity 
share, and those which are in industries where foreign ﬁrms are not predominant.  
Over time, the probability of a joint venture being terminated by acquisitions by 
domestic partners remains at the same level, or even decreases. These different patterns for 
the evolution of the probability of joint ventures being terminated by the acquisition of one 
or the other partner is consistent with the idea that the assets of the domestic partner are 
easier to learn than the assets of the foreign partner (Inkpen and Beamish, 1997). Foreign 
partners may learn from domestic ones what they need for operating a wholly owned 
business, but there is no evidence that domestic partners can do the same.  
The pattern of the time evolution of the hazards of being closed down is consistent with 
a view of footloose multinationals (Gorg and Strobl, 2003). Foreign ﬁrms may enter a 
country to exploit an opportunity which is limited in time — or will stay in the country as 
long as an alternative does not emerge that is more interesting. Gorg and Strobl (2003) have 
found that foreign ﬁrms will be more likely to exit the country than comparable 
domestically owned ﬁrms. On the contrary, Zaheer and Mosakowski (1997) present 
evidence suggesting that this difference in exit attenuates over time. According to their 
explanation, foreign ﬁrms would be more likely to exit in the ﬁrst years of operation, due to 
a liability of foreignness, but as experience brings knowledge about local conditions, this 
initial disadvantage would vanish and exit would become as likely as that of a comparable   26
domestic ﬁrm. If anything, the evidence reported by Mata and Portugal (2002) indicates an 
opposite pattern. After a few years with similar exit probabilities, foreign ﬁrms become 
more likely to exit than domestic ones, although the difference is not statistically 
signiﬁcant. Our observation that foreign ﬁrms will exit the country with probabilities that 
increase over time is not strictly incompatible with the evidence presented in any of these 
studies. It seems, however, closer to the view of the footloose multinationals than with that 
of diminishing liability of foreignness.  
Another interesting suggestion that was made in the literature is that joint ventures may 
be options held by foreign partners. In the original formulation of this hypothesis, Kogut 
(1991) viewed joint ventures as options to expand in case the foreign owner would need to 
do so. Buckley and Casson (1998) argue persuasively that the domestic partner may also be 
a ready buyer in those cases where the foreign ﬁrm decides to divest. The option value of 
joint ventures might lie in the possibility of acquiring information about market prospects 
for some time and then decide on whether to acquire or divest. They stress that during this 
relatively short interim period, it is important to develop trust among partners, and one 
might be tempted to speculate that this suggestion would be supported by our evidence, as 
we ﬁnd a relatively short period in which the probability of exit decreases, followed by a 
period in which it increases. However, this hypothesis would imply a symmetrical pattern 
for the acquisitions and divestments by foreign partners, which we deﬁnitely do not ﬁnd in 
our data.  
The important asymmetry between domestic and foreign partners that we ﬁnd suggests 
a rather more passive role for domestic than for foreign partners. Foreign partners will 
never consider acquiring some joint ventures. In those cases that they do, however, they do 
so with increasing probabilities over time. Yet, the probability of fully acquiring the joint 
venture is low as compared to the probabilities of dissolving the joint venture. The two 
combined results indicate that foreign partners will exit the country with an increasing 
probability over time. On the contrary, domestic partners will not exclude fully acquiring 
any of the joint ventures they take part in, but they will not become more active in seeking 
to do it (or in successfully doing it) over time. Taken together with the observation that 
multinationals may be footloose, it is tempting to speculate that domestic partners take full 
control of the joint ventures when, and if, foreign partners are no longer interested in taking   27
part in them.  
 
8 Conclusion  
This paper reports the results of a detailed investigation into the time pattern of joint 
ventures termination. By distinguishing between three modes of terminating and by 
adopting a very ﬂexible speciﬁcation for the effect of age upon the chances of termination, 
we were able to shed light into a number of previously uncovered facts.  
First, different modes of termination are determined by different factors. While closures 
are associated with factors that have been identiﬁed as determinants of ﬁrm exits in general 
(size, intangible assets and previous existence to the formation of the joint venture), 
acquisition by one of the partners is related to the original equity split between the partners, 
and in the case of acquisition by the foreign partner, to a previous foreign ownership of the 
ﬁrm. Previous foreign presence was shown to be related to all modes of termination: 
favoring acquisitions by foreign partners and decreasing the odds of acquisition by the 
domestic partner or closure of the ﬁrm.  
Second, the temporal patterns of exit are complex and also differ, depending on the 
termination mode. The odds of a joint venture being acquired by a domestic partner are 
pretty much constant over time. In contrast, after a short honeymoon period, the chances of 
a joint venture being shut down or being acquired by a foreign partner increase. However, 
there is also a nonnegligible share of the total number of joint ventures that will never be 
shut down or acquired by a foreign partner. Not surprisingly, the age increasing pattern of 
the probability that a joint venture is acquired or shut down is more clearly shown when 
controlling for this possibility. This possibility is not visible in the data for domestic 
acquisitions.  
Overall, our results indicate that the likelihood of joint venture termination increases 
over time. Our evidence indicates that this is much more likely to occur via the acquisition 
by foreign partners than by domestic ones and supports the notion that learning from the 
other partner is an important determinant of the longevity of joint ventures.  
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics.
Std. Correlations
Variable Mean Dev. (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Equity Share (1) 0.51 0.21
Formerly Domestic (2) 0.43 0.50 -0.13
Formerly Foreign (3) 0.05 0.23 0.14 -0.21
College Graduates (4) 0.14 0.23 -0.10 -0.10 -0.05
Foreign Presence (5) 0.15 0.17 -0.10 0.05 0.03 0.04
Size (6) 2.65 1.64 -0.13 0.36 0.11 -0.23 0.24
Table 2: Survival rate as joint ventures.
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Figure 1: Hazard rates
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